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I need Guinea pigs...

One  of the problems I face, is trying to convince people to use new security products.   They say, "Sure just don't break anything".  The problem is I need Guinea pigs to find out what I break.  In the case of confining the user, I have a problem.  I believe this can be a big security step forward, but how do I get people to use it, if it is not fully tested out?  How do I test it out without getting people to use it?

Now I have taken some involuntary test subjects like my wife, and set her up with a confined user account and worked with her to fix problems in xguest.  I have also taken the Jonas Salk approach and tested on my self.  I have been running as the staff_u user for the entire run of Rawhide since Fedora 8.

So I am now beginning to Beg co-workers to try it out.  As people start to install Fedora 9, I want them to try out confined users.  The simplest user for an engineer to try is staff_u with a transition to unconfined_t when you become root.

This is how I set this up.

First you need to modify the SELinux user record to allow it to reach the unconfined_r.  You also want to allow it to reach the system_r since you might be restarting services which need to run as system_r.  The command is a little ugly but follow along

# semanage user -m -R"staff_r unconfined_r system_r" staff_u
This tells the system to modify the staff_u user and allow it to reach the staff_r, unconfined_r and system_r roles.

Now we need to modify the login account to login as the staff_u SELinux user.

We can either change the default, so all users by default will login as the staff_u user.

# semanage login -m -s staff_u __default__

Or we can add a record just for my Linux user "dwalsh"

# semanage login -a -s staff_u -r s0-s0:c0.c1023 dwalsh

Finally I want to setup a sudo to allow me to transition from staff_t to unconfined_t when running commands using sudo.

Add a record like to following using visudo

dwalsh  ALL=(ALL) TYPE=unconfined_t ROLE=unconfined_r   ALL

Now logout and log back in and you should be running as staff_u:staff_r:staff_t,

Execute "sudo sh" and you should be running as staff_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t.

One caveat for this environment is currently userhelper apps will not work (system-config-*) when executed from staff_t,  But you can run them from the sudo root account.

What does this buy you?  While running in staff_t you will not be allowed to run any setuid application that is not confined.  So if somehow you were tricked into running a setuid app on your machine to become root, it will fail.  You will automatically transition to nsplugin so  your firefox will have confinement.  The ONLY way to become root/unconfined_t is through sudo, which is a well studied application.  If you run attempt to run su, you will be denied.

So do I have any volunteers????

I am fixing a typo in the command above sorry about reposting.

Also if you want to reverse the changes listed above

You could execute

semanage login -d dwalsh

Will remove the record and put dwalsh back to the default.

# semanage login -m -s unconfined_u __default__

Would set the default logins to be unconfined_u (the default)

Re: staff_r role privileges


2008-08-12 09:29 am (UTC)

Hi Dan,

To be very precise I'm working on: Scientific Linux SL release 5.1(2.6.18-53.1.4.el5), I think SELinux implementation in this release is equivalent to FC9 (In earlier post I mistyped FC9 as FC5, apology for that...)

I'm running SELinux STRICT policy in enforcing mode. Semanage command output is as follows:-

[root@xyz ~]# semanage login -l

Login Name SELinux User MLS/MCS Range

__default__ user_u s0
admin staff_u s0
root root s0-s0:c0.c1023
system_u system_u s0-s0:c0.c1023

[root@xyz ~]# semanage user -l

Labeling MLS/ MLS/
SELinux User Prefix MCS Level MCS Range SELinux Roles

root sysadm s0 s0-s0:c0.c1023 system_r sysadm_r staff_r
staff_u staff s0 s0-s0:c0.c1023 staff_r
sysadm_u sysadm s0 s0-s0:c0.c1023 sysadm_r
system_u user s0 s0-s0:c0.c1023 system_r
user_u user s0 s0 user_r

I've put 'admin' user in sudoers list and allowed him to reboot, shutdown the machine.

OK when I start executing the command "sudo /sbin/reboot" I got lot of avc's. When I used audit2allow utility on these messages I got following "type-enforcement" file :-

module test 1.0;

require {
type staff_t;
type root_t;
type sysadm_home_t;
type staff_devpts_t;
type init_exec_t;
type var_run_t;
type pam_var_run_t;
type kernel_t;
type pam_var_run_t;
type sysadm_devpts_t;
type initctl_t;
class system syslog_mod;
class chr_file { relabelfrom relabelto setattr };
class capability { setuid sys_resource dac_override };
class fifo_file write;
class key search;
class file { rename setattr read create execute_no_trans execute write relabelfrom getattr relabelto unlink append };
class dir { read write search getattr setattr remove_name add_name };

#============= staff_t ==============
allow staff_t init_exec_t:file { read execute_no_trans execute };
allow staff_t initctl_t:fifo_file write;
allow staff_t kernel_t:key search;
allow staff_t kernel_t:system syslog_mod;
allow staff_t pam_var_run_t:dir { write setattr };
allow staff_t root_t:dir { write add_name };
allow staff_t root_t:file { read write create };
allow staff_t self:capability { setuid sys_resource dac_override };
allow staff_t staff_devpts_t:chr_file relabelfrom;
allow staff_t sysadm_devpts_t:chr_file relabelto;
allow staff_t sysadm_home_t:file { read write append };
allow staff_t var_run_t:dir { write remove_name add_name };
allow staff_t var_run_t:file { write read create unlink };
allow staff_t pam_var_run_t:dir { write remove_name add_name search getattr };
allow staff_t pam_var_run_t:file { write read create unlink };

On loading this file as policy using semodule, I'm able to reboot the machine from admin account. Now the question is: Is the above mentioned 'allow' rules cause some kind of security threat/flaw??? as lot of things are now allowed for "staff_t" type...for example: allow staff_t root_t:dir { write add_name };

How to make sure that user 'admin' in 'staff_r' role is not going to harm my machine in any way???

Your help will be highly appreciated.

Thanks in advance.

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