Virtualization Under Attack: Breaking out of KVM
The exploit, CVE-2011-1751, would allow a cracker to execute code in qemu-kvm process on the host.
Note: Red Hat fixed this problem back in May 2011 prior to the publication of the paper and exploit. Customers who applied our security updates are not affected by this issue. So 0 days of exposure.
In the presentation there is this bullet point:
qemu-kvm is often sandboxed using SELinux or similar, meaning that
successful exploitation will often require a second privesc within the
(Fortunately, Linux never has any of those)
This means that SELinux/sVirt on Red Hat Enterprise Linux and Fedora confines this outbreak!
In a previous blog, Fun with sVirt., I showed how you can simulate this vulnerability to see what access was available. Not much...
Nelson mentioned SELinux sandboxing could be bypassed by a theoretical second "privesc" vulnerability, meaning a bug in the kernel. SELinux or any kind of Mandatory Access Control is enforced by the Kernel. Bugs in that Kernel, that a process is allowed to access, can subvirt SELinux. But SELinux is putting up a significant second barrier to the cracker.
Security is all about Layers, making each layer as secure as possible and then fixing vulnerabilities as quickly as you know about them.
This presentation exposes the risk associated with virtualization, but also shows the secondary security controls Linux KVM is using to minimize the risk and giving us time to fix problems as soon as we know about them.
Bottom line, this is why you leave SELinux enabled in enforcing mode. :^)