The default location of a user's Kerberos Credential Cache (CC) has moved from /tmp to user directory under /run/user.
Back in the 1980's, when Kerberos was first developed, various login programs were enhanced to talk to the Kerberos servers to authenticate users, and to store credentials (tickets and session keys) that they obtained while doing so in a file, sometimes called a ticket file, but now more commonly called a credential cache (ccache for short), for the user to use during their session.
The cache had to be owned by the user, so that additional tickets obtained by the user could be added to the cache, and so that it could be cleared or just destroyed.
For the sake of users whose credentials were needed for accessing a remote home directory, login programs could not store the credentials in the user's home directory. Since the only other location where a user could write to was the /tmp directory, the cache file was stored there by default.
Security Problems with the Credential Cache file in /tmp.
There were a couple of problems with storing the cache file in /tmp:
- All users of the system can write to /tmp. To sidestep the possibility that a rogue user could trick the system into writing a user's credentials to an incorrect location, many login facilities would generate uniquely-named credential caches for users. Others used predictable but different names for various other reasons.
- But when the name of a user's credential cache isn't predictable, it can cause problems for services which don't run as part of the user's session, and which therefore can't consult the $KRB5CCNAME environment variable to discover which cache to use. Services like these, for example rpc.gssd (the daemon which handles the client parts of Kerberized NFS), have historically had to make a best-guess as to what the Kerberos credential cache file's name was, and they had to do that by trawling through /tmp, looking for potential matches.
- /tmp can be setup using pam_namespace such that processes running in the "root" namespace will see a different /tmp then the user sees when he logs in. This can prevent services from even being able to find the Credential Cache.
- The /tmp directory is often not a temporary file system. Logging out of the system or rebooting the system would not guarantee the Credential Cache would be removed/destroyed.
SSSD to the rescue in Fedora 18
In Fedora 18 the Credential Cache file was moved by SSSD, System Security Services Daemon, to /run/user/UID/krb5cc_XXXXXX/tkt.
Where XXXXXX is a random number.
For example on my box when I execute klist i see the following:
Ticket cache: DIR::/run/user/3267/krb5cc_ca3a4331e17e8
Default principal: dwalsh@REDHAT.COM
Valid starting Expires Service principal
10/12/12 12:48:17 10/12/12 22:48:17 krbtgt/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM
renew until 10/12/12 12:48:17
Note: There are two colons between "DIR" and the path part of the ccache name gives away that the parent of the named path is the directory that's being used to hold the cache file (or possibly more than one cache file).
The main benefit here is that /run/user/3267 and all its sub-directories have a mask of 700 and are owned by dwalsh:dwalsh. No other users know that the cache is there, and they can't tell how big it is or when it was last touched. This means we don't have to deal with other users trying to mess around in /tmp.
Secondarily /run is always tmpfs, if the user logs out cache gets destroyed and if the system crashes the cache file is also gone.
Since the tickets are stored in a predictable path, privileged processes like rpc.gssd have an easy time finding the correct tickets. And since they are off of /tmp, pam_namespace will not hide the credential cache from the system services.
Finally now SSSD can actually get multiple tickets from different domains and easily store them in the /run directory, allowing a user
to login into multiple kerberos domains at the same time.